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Introduction   
 
The view of line-bound energy industries as "natural monopolies" has changed considerably 
during recent years upon the perception that each of the industries could be seen as a 
combination of different functions. The natural monopoly perception for each function has 
been reassessed, resulting in many cases in transportation functions such as transmission and 
distribution as well as dispatch remaining as natural monopolies but other functions such as 
generation, wholesale and retail sales, metering, billing etc. being candidates for competitive 
opening. This new theoretical paradigm has stirred restructuring and deregulation of line-
bound energy industries in a number of countries with the most prominent examples of the UK 
(Electricity Act of 1989) and Norway (Electricity Act of 1990) with other countries like the 
USA (Energy Policy Act of 1992) and Sweden (Competitive Electricity Market Bill of 1992) 
following behind. 
The Government of Republic of Korea recently announced it plans to wrap up all corporate 
reforms by the end of this year whatever that costs. Financial institutions at home and abroad 
have issued a warning that South Korea may implode if it does not implement the restructuring 
program fully, in both the financial and corporate sector in accordance with the government 
commitments. At this junction the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) offers a good 
example how to carry out a serious self-reform plan and has won praise as a role model for the 
shake up in the public sector. Concerning the objectives of the restructuring KEPCO gives 
three answers: introduction of competition in the power industry, raising efficiency, guarantee 
of long term electricity supply & demand and attraction of private investors.   
The paper gives an overview of the restructuring process in the Korean power industry and is 
based on the involvement of KEMA Consulting in the development of the new power market 
design in Korea during the last 18 months. KEMA Consulting led a consulting team that was 
responsible for the development of detailed market rules (pool rules, settlement rules), system 
rules (dispatch, metering, frequency control, voltage control, contingency planning etc.), 
network rules (planning, connection etc.) and network pricing methodology.  
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In the development of market design a number of different electricity structures and markets 
from around the world have been reviewed.  The markets considered for the identification of 
the market design proposal for the last stage of restructuring (Two Way Bidding Pool) were: 
 
 England & Wales 
 Netherlands 
 NEMMCO, Australia 
 PJM, USA 
 
These four markets were selected in consultation with KEPCO as all have been deregulated 
and restructured with a combination of common and unique features and as such provide 
representative evidence of a number of different mechanisms that may be employed in a 
deregulated electricity sector.  This article describes some of the most significant aspects of the 
documentation developed by the consulting team in cooperation with the counterpart experts 
from the Korean Electric Power Corporation in the course of the project.  
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Status Quo  
 
Until now the electricity supply industry in Korea has been organised in a state owned 
vertically integrated company – the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). KEPCO is 
engaged in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in Korea. At the end of 
December 1998, it owned 94,2 % of the total electricity generating capacity in Korea, 
excluding plants that are primarily generating electricity for private and emergency use. At that 
time the total installed capacity excluding non-utility capacity in common use
3
 was 43,406 
MW of which KEPCO owned 40,891 MW and the rest were either owned by Independent 
Power Projects (IPPs) or by the state owned water utility.  
The power system of the Republic of Korea has an integrated transmission network owned and 
operated by KEPCO with equipment at several voltage levels - main transmission is at 345 kV, 
with a small, but growing amount at 765 kV. There are no interconnections with other 
countries. The 345 kV and 765 kV levels are under the direct control of the National Control 
Centre (NCC) in KEPCO headquarters, Seoul. The next level down is 154 kV, which is under 
the operational control of the nine Regional Control Centres (RCCs) who are also part of 
KEPCO. Some of the 154 kV equipment remains under the control of the NCC because of its 
strategic importance. The RCCs also control the lower voltage networks at 66 and 22.9 kV, 
even down to the distribution circuits to consumer loads connected to the 22.9 kV bus-bars. In 
terms of dynamics there is a limit to the power which can be safely transmitted from the south 
to the north of the country imposed by transient stability considerations. 
The organisation of the power sector is based on the vertically integrated utility model with 
strongly centralised management and regulatory control exercised by the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE). As an entity formed to serve the public policy 
goals of the Government, KEPCO seeks to maintain an overall level of profitability, allowing 
it to strengthen its equity base in order to support the growth of its business. KEPCO’s 
electricity rates are established pursuant to procedures that take into account the needs to 
recover the costs of operations to make future capital investments and to provide a fair return 
to its security holders but which also reflect the social and economic needs of the Korean 
economy. 
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Reasons for Restructuring   
 
Efficiency Improvement  
 
In the new industrial society the efficiency improvements in the industry organisation in terms 
of business process and ownership control have become important. The electricity supply 
industry in Korea faced the challenge to improve the existing system, in which it was judged 
that a single public corporation operating most of the electricity supply industry was not 
appropriate and the need to develop a market-based system driven by competitive behaviour 
was the solution.  
 
Attraction of Foreign Capital   
 
Restructuring and privatisation of the power sector was also seen as a tool for attracting foreign 
investors, an important factor for the Government as it would enable a substantial reduction in 
public debt, particularly in future years. Given the expected strong demand growth trends in 
Korea, the estimated investment needed in new generation capacity over the next decade is 
around 30 billion U.S. Dollars. Without the reforms and privatisation, much of this would by 
necessity have been funded by raising public debt.   
 
Introduction of Competition    
 
Competition may exist on generation and power sale level, which shall evolve over time as 
experience with and confidence in the new market mechanism grows. However, in order to 
make this competition work in practice and to ensure that the market is not hindered in his 
development towards increased competition, these competitive functions should be split from 
the monopoly functions. Separation of generation and power sale businesses from KEPCO will 
be a prerequisite for introduction of competition in generation and supply.   
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Restructuring Process and New Market Design 
 
On January 21 1999 MOCIE (Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy) announced 
publicly the “Basic Plan for Restructuring of the Electricity Supply Industry” (Blueprint of 
Restructuring). The Blueprint stipulates the major changes: separation of the various activities, 
introduction of a power market and development of a regulatory framework constituting an 
independent regulator. The Blueprint sets out a three-stage process for the development of a 
competitive market on wholesale and retail level (see Figure 1) based on a central pooling and 
multiple supply with first two stages scheduled for operation in 2000 to 2002 timeframe. The 
first stage includes separation of generation and introduction of a Cost Based Pool (CBP), 
where the level of the generators’offers will be restricted to a certain cost reflective level. The 
introduction of CBP will provide a mechanism for the generators to start trading and will serve 
as an intermediary step towards a fully competitive Price Based Pool (PBP), scheduled to be 
operational from late 2001. The PBP will operate on similar logic with the key difference that 
the generators’ offers will not be restricted to regulated cost level but rather subject to 
commercial strategies of generation companies.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Stages in the Power Sector Reform  
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The second (2003 –2008) stage envisages the introduction of competitions in wholesale supply 
and a Two Way Bidding Pool (TWBP). During this phase large customers will be able to seek 
competitive supplies whilst smaller and domestic loads will be allocated into franchise areas 
for the newly created multiple power sale businesses. In order to enable this the distribution 
and power sale business elements will be split from KEPCO into subsidiary distribution 
companies and kept as separate entities within these companies (distribution network service 
providers and power sale businesses). The TWBP will aim to reflect the demand 
responsiveness to pool prices through the introduction of demand bids and to establish prices 
based on competitive bidding on both generation and demand side.  
The third and final stage of the restructuring process (after 2008) will introduce a competition 
in retail supply. In this case also the small consumers would be allowed to choose their 
suppliers.  
The legal platform for the implementation of the Government plans in the power sector was the 
new Electricity Business Act adopted by the Parliament in December 2000. The new 
Electricity Business Act requires the establishment of a Korean Electric Power Exchange 
(KPX), responsible for system and wholesale electricity market operation, and introduction of 
electricity market on wholesale and retail level of the electric industry. 
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Competition in Generation  
 
Establishment of Generation Companies  
 
According to the Blueprint during the first stage of restructuring, the generation sector will be 
separated from KEPCO in new subsidiary companies (see Figure 2). This is necessary to 
ensure that the competitive generation business is unbundled from the monopoly network 
functions. As the new subsidiary companies will compete among themselves, the allocation of 
power plants would need to be appropriately balanced in order to prevent any financial, 
commercial or structural advantages being given to any single subsidiary. Six generation 
companies will be established. Five of them will include a balanced generation mix (in terms 
of technology, fuel and commercial chances) and one will accommodate all nuclear power 
plants.  
 
Establishment of Korean Power Exchange   
 
The system and market operation functions will be carried out by the Korean Power Exchange 
(KPX). The KPX will be a fully independent ‘non profit’ organization that is  ‘Chinese walled’ 
in terms of data, which is market sensitive. KEPCO will retain the responsibility for 
transmission network, distribution network and power sale business. 
 
Establishment of Cost Based Pool    
 
The first step to introduction of competition in generation is the establishment of Cost Based 
Pool (CBP). All generation above 20 MW will be required to participate in the pool. The 
commercial boundary for the generation companies will be the point of access to the 
transmission assets owned by KEPCO, i.e. the high voltage side of the generating unit (step-up) 
transformer.  
All generating units participating in the Pool offer availability and price in the pool for each 
trading period (one hour) of the next trading day. The level of prices included in the offers will 
be restricted to the level of generating units’ avoidable costs. A generating unit’s avoidable 
costs are those costs that are incurred only when the generating unit is in an active state. They 
also include costs incurred in the preparation of the unit to start. The avoidable costs will be 
based largely upon existing data (heat rates, fuel costs, contractual arrangements for fuel 
consumption etc.) and will be approved by the Regulator for all generating units prior to 
implementation of the CBP. 
A forecast of demand will be made by the KPX for the purposes of scheduling. The KPX will 
produce an ex ante price setting schedule for all generating units participating in the pool on 
the basis of their offers for each trading period using demand forecast for the following day. 
The price setting schedule will be derived using the day ahead generator offers (bid prices, 
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availability, dynamic parameters) together with the forecast demand for generating plant and 
allowance for reserve requirements. Any operational constraints resulting from contractual or 
policy constraints (e.g. fuel contract obligations, mandatory power purchase etc.)
4
 and system 
constraints
5
 will not be considered in the preparation of the price setting schedule. The real 
time despatch (operational schedule) will take into consideration the various constraints.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Competition in Generation   
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  Contractual and policy constraints are constraints caused by existing obligations and energy policy 
requirements to generating units. It has been indicated that such constraints may exist in respect to take 
or pay fuel procurement contracts for domestic coal and LNG fired plants associated with the take or pay 
clauses of their fuel procurement contracts. Further, certain CHP may be constrained on because of the 
need to produce heat and cover their heat demand.  In real-time operation a constrained on CHP plant 
will be substituted for some more economic plants that were scheduled in the price setting schedule.    
5
  System constraints are constraints caused by the obligation of the KPX to ensure reliable and stable 
system functioning. Such constraints may occur with respect to power transport (transmission 
constraints) or provision of ancillary services. In case of transmission constraints some of the generating 
units will have to be re-dispatched and have to be operated in constraint on or constraint off mode. Plant 
may also need to be re-dispatched because of requirements for reserve or reactive power. 
 
` 
 
 
 
 
Offers Offers  
KPX (System Market Operator)  
Transmission, Distribution and Power Sales (KEPCO) 
Customers 
Generators 
 
 Generators  
Pool Selling Price  
Commercial Flow 
Physical Flow  
 9 
The KPX will be obliged to procure ancillary services in order to ensure the stable and secure 
system operation. 6  
The market clearing price is established each hour and represents the offers of the last most 
expensive generating unit for this hour.
7
 Generation meter readings will be conducted for all 
generating units participating in the pool over the 24-hour schedule day. Settlement system 
will collect and aggregate data (energy scheduled and produced data relating to each hour) and 
calculate the payments to the generating units.  
The generating units included in the price setting schedule will receive energy payments on the 
basis of the market clearing price. All generating units available will receive capacity 
payments irrespective of their real commitment in the pool
8
. The capacity fee will be 
calculated through using the investment cost of a reference peak generation plant (open cycle 
gas turbine) and annuity factor.
9
 In order to ensure non-discriminatory and transparent rules for 
the calculation and payment of capacity fee, the Regulator will set and approve the procedures 
for determination and levels of the capacity fee prior to implementation of the CBP. 
Additionally the generating units will receive constraint on and constraint off payments. The 
constrained on generating units are units that will run with increased output although not being 
scheduled in the price setting schedule. If the generating units are not included in the price 
setting schedule but dispatched (because of constraints), every kWh produced usually will 
                                                          
6
  Ancillary services are the services related to the reliable functioning of the power system, e.g. voltage 
reactive power control, frequency control and reserve capacity, black-start facilities etc. The need to treat 
ancillary services explicitly is caused by the unbundling of the power industry. In the traditional 
organization of the power industry, generation and network operation are functions performed by the 
same company. The company as a whole is responsible for a reliable supply to all customers. In the new 
market structure these services must be clearly defined in order to enable the safe and secure operation of 
the system, and to avoid the possibility that correct market functioning is distorted leading to inefficient 
behavior of different players. After unbundling, the KPX is responsible for a reliable operation of the 
networks. However, the KPX cannot fulfill this responsibility on its own. It needs the support from 
generating units and the generating units provide ancillary services to the KPX. 
7
  It is important to recognise that a number of additional factors could apply to the calculation of system 
marginal price within pool arrangements. Certain plants could be excluded from system marginal price 
calculation, even though they may have the highest incremental generation cost of the plant which are 
running – this is associated with generation inflexibility and may arise where the highest cost plant is 
running in the period concerned only because of limitations in its ramp-up or ramp-down rates.   
8
  In general there are two design concepts for capacity payment design: short run marginal cost (SRMC) 
and long run marginal cost concept (LRMC). In a given period, SRMC will be equal to the marginal 
energy cost plus shortage costs for unmet demand. Actually the second term (shortage costs for unmet 
demand) has a demand rationing function and will provide an additional compensation based on the 
system value of availability in the different time periods. This concept is used in the power pool of 
England and Wales. The LRMC is the cost of meeting an increase in demand, in a situation where 
capacity adjustments are possible. Since the LRMC include energy and capacity component the capacity 
payment is based on the annualized capacity cost of the marginal plant needed. This concept is used in 
the power sector of Chile. 
9
  It is a matter for debate whether the capacity payments are necessary for the competitive electricity 
markets. They are often justified with the assurance of long term stability requirements of the market 
participants.
 
Also the peak load pricing theory provides for capacity payments equivalent to the capacity 
cost of a peak load facility (e.g. gas turbine). Some economists argue against this position and allege that 
in the pure contestable markets there is no need for additional price elements and market price should 
reflect the actual equilibrium between the demand and supply. The proposed approach aims to ensure a 
smooth transition to the new competitive environment. It will not distort short term marginal cost signals 
provided by the system marginal price and will provide an incentive to make plants available and assure 
additional revenues to cover the generating units’ fixed cost. The capacity payments will be abolished 
with the introduction of the Two Way Bidding Pool. 
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incur higher cost than the market clearing price. These plants will receive their offer price for 
the extent of out merit order running (energy dispatched in the operation schedule but not 
scheduled in the price setting schedule). The constrained off generating units are units that will 
not run, or run with decreased output although being scheduled in the price setting schedule. 
The generating units that are constrained-off in a certain settlement period, will be paid for 
their lost profits, defined as market clearing price minus offered price multiplied by the 
constrained-off energy (energy scheduled in the price setting schedule but not dispatched). 
10
  
 
Establishment of Price Based Pool    
 
In the CBP environment the generators are restricted to offer prices not higher than the 
avoidable costs of their generating units. In the PBP this restriction will be removed and 
generating units may be offered at a commercial price, as determined exclusively by their 
generation companies. All pool arrangements concerning the bidding, establishment of market 
clearing price, settlement rules etc. will remain the same. 
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  The guaranteed compensation of constraint off payments is a debatable issue. In the UK pool these plants 
receive a payment based on their opportunity costs (revenue from system marginal price minus revenue 
from their bid price). The mechanism is by no means universally established. The logic of this model is 
based on firm access and notional rights to use the transmission network. It could be argued that this 
mechanism create some gaming potentials because the power stations knowing in advance that they will 
be constrained off, submit bids not reflecting their actual availability and below their short run marginal 
cost and receive unfair profits. In the CBP, generating units will bid their avoided cost (set and approved 
by the Regulator) and availability. Given this fact the gaming potential of any generator to increase its 
market share by manipulating its availability will be limited and the introduction of constrained-off 
payments will not lead to significant additional payments. Furthermore, this will create incentives for the 
generating units to be available and will reward them according to their position in the price setting 
schedule. 
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Competition in Wholesale Supply    
 
The second stage of the restructuring process focuses on the establishment of competition in 
wholesale supply. The introduction of competitive environment in wholesale supply will 
require the establishment of distribution companies and splitting the distribution network 
service from the power sale service within these distribution companies. During this phase 
large customers will be able to seek competitive supplies whilst smaller and domestic loads 
will be allocated into franchise areas for the newly created multiple supply businesses. Further 
the wholesale market design will be accomplished with the implementation of Two Way 
Bidding Pool (TWBP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Competition in Wholesale Supply    
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Establishment of Distribution Companies    
 
The newly created distribution companies will be responsible for distribution network service 
(acting as a distribution network service provider) and power sale service (acting as a power 
seller). The distribution companies will own and operate the middle and low voltage (under 
154 kV) networks within the distribution company’s franchise area. The distribution network 
service providers will be a monopoly in a defined geographical area determined by the location 
of their assets. It will own and manage the distribution assets and will provide services in a 
non-discriminative way, giving appropriate returns to shareholders in line with the regulatory 
arrangements. The activities and accounts of the distribution network service provider will be 
ring-fenced and separated from any competitive function, power sales in particular, carried out 
by the distribution company that owns that distribution network. The power sale business will 
have the authority to contract with end customers for energy supply both within its own 
franchise area (coinciding with the franchise area of its parent distribution company) and, for 
those sectors of the market open to competition, in the geographical areas of other distribution 
companies.  
 
Establishment of Transmission Company 
 
Following establishment of the distribution companies, KEPCO will become the transmission 
asset owner (the system and market operator functions having already been divested into a 
separate organisation - the Korean Power Exchange – during the transition from CBP to 
TWBP). KEPCO will continue as a regulated monopoly owning and managing the 
transmission assets (765 kV, 345 kV and 154 kV lines), providing a transmission network 
service in a non-discriminative way and giving appropriate returns to its shareholders in line 
with the regulatory arrangements.  
 
Establishment of Two Way Bidding Pool (TWBP) 
 
The basic concept of the TWBP is to establish prices through competitive bidding of both 
generation and demand side.
11
 Whilst an approach such as this proposes to treat electricity as a 
normal commodity, with buyers and sellers operating in an efficient and transparent market 
place, it must be recognised that there are a number of features unique to electricity supply and 
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  Across the world the majority of electricity pools are essentially one-sided, where generators offer 
generation but with no corresponding bidding by demand. There is however the opportunity in most one-
sided pools for some demand to bid as negative generation, whereby load reduction is triggered by pool 
prices and is centrally dispatched as such by the system operator. This limited form of negative 
generation bidding is effectively only a variation of a one sided pool.  A one-sided pool does not allow 
the demand side to be fully active in determining market prices and to see the effect of their market 
actions. 
 13 
that would require adaptation of classical market principles.  
All generation greater than 20MW and power sales business parties will become members of 
the pool and trade energy solely within the pool. The TWBP is thus a compulsory trading 
market.  All generators with units greater than 20 MW will be centrally despatched by the KPX 
in accordance with processes defined in the system rules. 
Generators will submit to the KPX simple offers linked to individual generating units.
12
 For 
each generating unit the generator will submit to the KPX an offer for each five minute time 
intervals of a trading day, in accordance with prescribed timescales and formats, on the basis of 
a single or multiple price and quantity combinations.
13
  The offer will be deemed to represent 
the quantity of electricity that a generator is prepared to sell at that price for that five minute 
time interval. The component parts of the offer will include: specified quantity to be offered at 
the generator ownership boundary (where it is measured), specified price for that quantity and 
some availability parameter including lower operating limit, lower operating limit start time etc. 
Recognition of other dynamic parameters will be the responsibility of the generating company 
through the pricing and structure of the offers. Cost elements such as start-up or no-load costs 
will not be included explicitly within the offer. An offer may contain a number of 
price/quantity bands.  Offers must be monotonically increasing in price. Offers for the 
following trading day will be made to the KPX by 10:00 of the day before (day-ahead offer). 
Prices contained in the day-ahead offer will be deemed to be firm.
14
 Generators may change 
the quantity element of their offer but not the price at any time prior to the defined trading 
period.  
Power sales businesses will submit to the KPX bids for each trading period of a trading day in 
accordance with prescribed timescales and formats, on the basis of a single or multiple price 
and quantity combinations.  The bid will be deemed to represent the quantity of electricity that 
a power sales business is prepared to purchase at, or below, that price for that trading period. A 
power sales business’s bid will represent the quantity to be consumed at the 
transmission/distribution border and will therefore include its estimate of distribution losses. A 
purchase bid may contain a number of price/quantity bands.  Purchase bids must be 
monotonically decreasing in price. Purchase bids for the following trading day will be made to 
the KPX by 10:00 of the day before (day-ahead bid). Prices contained in the day-ahead bid will 
be deemed to be firm. Power sale businesses may change the quantity element of their bids but 
not the price at any time prior to the defined trading period. 
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  Generator offers can be described as complex or simple. A complex offer includes several parameters 
such as start-up costs, no-load costs etc.  In addition complex offers may include dynamic parameters 
such as ramp rates and whether the plant is flexible, i.e. it can readily adapt to changes in load or 
inflexible, where it must maintain a steady, continuous output. By contrast a simple offer consists of 
monotonically increasing basic price/quantity combinations and simple dynamic parameters such as 
ramping rate and minimum on/off criteria. Complex offers are unwieldy, require complex software and 
limit the price transparency that enables participants to see how a cleared price has been determined.  
Where simple offers are used, such as in Australia, plant dynamics can be structured within a simple 
offer, this enables much faster solution and greater transparency. 
13
   The five minute time interval is called unconstrained five minute dispatch scheduling period and is 
shorter than the trading period (30 minutes). As the market clearing price will be established for each 
trading period the five minute prices will be aggregated across the time of 30 minutes.   
14
  Firm offers means offers with fixed conditions and non-firm offers means offers that could be changed. 
Firm offers, which fix prices but allow quantity to be changed, enable prices to be set in the market with 
participants still able to adjust their quantities without having to have continuous re-iterations and re-
offers. 
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The TWBP model determines the market clearing price as the intersection of the demand and 
supply price volume curves in the classical manner.  The resulting cleared price and volume, as 
shown below, classically suggests a point where demand and supply is satisfied, the 
equilibrium price and volume (see Figure 4). 
15
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Market Equilibrium in a Two Way Bidding Pool     
 
Following receipt of day-ahead bids and offers, the KPX shall calculate the forecast market 
clearing prices and the pre-dispatch schedule for each trading period of the following trading 
day. For each trading period of the trading day in question, the KPX will aggregate all demand 
bids to determine a forecast market demand. This will then be grossed up to take into account 
transmission system losses and will have the effect of shifting the power sales bids curve 
upwards, i.e. losses are added at all demand levels
16
. The KPX will create an offer price order 
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  A number of markets examined currently operate with complete demand bidding arrangements.  Both the 
future market arrangements in England & Wale and the Netherlands when implemented will provide full 
demand side participation.  Two Way Bidding Pools do, however, exist elsewhere, notably in New 
Zealand, NordPool and in the former VicPool in Australia.   
16
  Static nodal (or zonal) marginal transmission loss factors will be used in the settlement process but not in 
the process of establishment of the market clearing price. The static transmission loss factors use 
historical values of transmission losses (from the relevant connection point to the reference network 
point) and could be classified as pre-determined or as ex-ante factors. Transmission loss rentals will 
appear as a result from the fact that the transmission losses are quadratic function of the power flow and 
Market 
Clearing 
Price
Market Clearing 
Volume
Price
Volume
Generation 
Offres 
Demand 
Bids 
 15 
stack of generation, beginning with the lowest price generating units, to enable the gross 
demand to be met.  The forecast market clearing price will be the single ex-ante system 
marginal price determined on the basis of pre-dispatch schedule and will be published in 
regular intervals at the day ahead stage.
17
  
A feature of the TWBP market is that forecast market clearing prices and volumes will be 
posted frequently so that participants can see the effects of their actions and act accordingly.
18
  
For the demand side this effectively enables them to self-dispatch against these prices.  With 
the model proposed the market has knowledge of forecast prices up to a few minutes before 
time so that it can respond to varying price signals. It can also indicate how it will alter its 
demand with price. However, it is the actual demand taken that sets actual prices. The method 
allows demand to participate fully in setting prices whilst recognising the reality that initially 
much demand may be relatively price insensitive and that it is not practical to dispatch it.  The 
arrangements work equally well when and if there is a large amount of price sensitive 
demand.
19
 
At the same time as publishing the forecast market clearing prices the KPX will publish a 
schedule to generators advising them of the plant which has been cleared in the forecast 
schedule and that which is forecast to be required.  Final market clearing price will be 
determined from a series of unconstrained schedules utilizing only generators offers and un 
estimate how demand is likely to change over the period up to and during the interval for whci 
the price is to be determined and demand bid data available.  
The operational (or constrained) schedule will determine the actual generation required in real 
time dispatch process, taking into account any variation required in order to meet reserve 
requirements and transmission system constraints. The operational schedule will be run each 
five minutes using the demand forecast prepared by the KPX but taking into account the 
aggregate forecast demands from power sales businesses bids together with losses and reserve 
requirements. The KPX will schedule generating units in accordance with the price stack 
derived from the market clearing process and will take into account constraints, reserve 
requirements and system security obligations. Fundamental for the real time dispatch will be 
the use of Automatic Generation Control.  
Any generating unit that is constrained off, either partially or fully, due to a transmission 
constraint or for other reasons, will receive compensation reflecting its opportunity costs 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
the marginal transmission loses (the first derivation) exceeds the average transmission losses. These 
rentals will be redirected to the transmission assets owner and to use them for the reduction of the annual 
revenue requirements of the transmission network for the purposes of derivation of transmission use of 
network charge.   
17
  Additional generation will be needed to meet reserve requirements. This potential level of additional 
reserve energy that might be utilised can be represented as a further shift to the right (upward) of the 
original demand curve. 
18
  The publication of forecast prices is expected to trigger demand side response.  Power sales businesses 
will see price signals ahead of time that will enable them to take appropriate action.  Such action may 
include peak reduction, load shifting or off-peak filling. Where demand makes itself available for 
despatch as reduction capability it will be subject to an ancillary service agreement. 
19
  There is the special case to consider of demand that is genuinely controllable.  Pumped storage 
generation is an important example of this type of demand. It is therefore proposed that this demand, as 
for all demand, be required to indicate the price above which it will pump. If some participants volunteer 
to take demand only when so despatched by the KPX, this should be treated as an ancillary service.  In 
such cases an additional payment should be made by the KPX for the additional “control” it has over that 
demand and the associated value to the system. 
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(profit foregone).  If a generator is constrained off due to transmission congestion, 
compensation will be paid by the transmission assets owner. If for any other reason, 
compensation will be paid by the KPX. Generating plant that is constrained-on because of a 
transmission constraint will be paid its offer price but will not set the market clearing price. 
 
Transmission Pricing   
 
Transmission charges will be made up of transmission use of network charge and transmission 
connection charge. The Korean situation is characterized through strong power demand growth, 
hence transmission price signals will play a significant role for the location of new generation 
and demand. The transmission use of network charge will be set irrespective of the distance it 
transported but taking into account the entry and exit points on the network.
20
 The transmission 
use of network charge shall recover the costs (including depreciation, operation and 
maintenance costs and financial return on the core transmission network assets) necessary for 
secure transport of power and will be subject to regulatory approval. Part of the core 
transmission network cost
21
 (e.g. 50 %) will be allocated to generation and load nodes taking 
into consideration the locational criteria and using Cost Reflective Network Pricing 
approach.
22
  The rest of the core transmission network cost will be allocated pro rata. 
Generation and demand pricing zones will be established.  
All transmission service users located in the same zone and operating in the same modus (take 
or delivery) will pay the same rates, i.e. all users defined as delivery transmission service users 
(generators) face the same charges (per unit) within the same zone and all those defined as take 
transmission service users (power sale businesses) face the same charge (per unit) within the 
same zone. The transmission use of network charges could be designed as a simple one-
component charge (WON/kW, rated capacity for the generation loads and observed load for 
the load nodes) or as a multi-component tariff (demand charge, energy charge and fixed 
charge).  
The transmission connection charge will cover only the cost of transmission connection 
assets
23
 (including depreciation, operation and maintenance costs and financial return on the 
transmission connection assets) without taking into consideration any reinforcement 
requirement in the transmission network infrastructure. The transmission connection charge 
                                                          
20
  The major characteristic of this approach is that the transmission service is provided for a specific 
connection point to the transmission network rather than to a specific transaction. That leads to 
transmission prices that are related to the type of transmission user and his connection points rather than 
to a specific transaction. 
21
  Core transmission network assets means assets owned by KEPCO and necessary for the provision of 
reliable and secure transportation of energy to the transmission service users.  
22
  The CRNP (Cost Reflective Network Pricing) cost allocation is a nodal based method and it requires all 
of the costs to be attributed to the links („lines“) between the nodes on the network. Some assets are 
wholly dedicated to providing network service to a participant or group at a single point. These assets 
can be allocated to the participant directly at the node. Other assets throughout the network are shared 
among the users and the relative use by each participant must be determined. The shared network costs 
are allocated amongst users based on the marginal change in the load flow (as a result of an increment of 
user load at each bus) of the network circuits. The Fault Level Contribution Matrix is used for pairing 
generation and load. 
23
  Transmission connection assets means assets owned by KEPCO and necessary for the provision of 
reliable physical connection to the transmission service users.  
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will be denominated in WON/year and paid by each transmission service user connected to the 
transmission network.  
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Retail Competition Phase (after 2009) 
 
Over the period 2003 to 2008, competitive supply will become increasingly available to 
smaller sectors of the market until in 2009, full retail competition will be introduced. In this 
phase every customer will have the opportunity to choose its suppliers. By this stage the power 
sale business of each distribution company will have to be separated from the distribution 
network service business to avoid protective interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Competition in Retail Supply      
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distribution network service provider and facilitate the regulatory control over the network 
charges.   
 
Concluding Remarks   
 
The legal, technical and commercial framework required for the implementation of the Cost 
Based Pool was completed by the end of 1999. The new arrangements were not implemented 
in January 2000 as scheduled as the new Electricity Business Act did not pass the Parliament. 
At beginning of December 2000 new Electricity Business Act passed the Industry and Energy 
Sub-Committee of the Parliament. Currently the Cost Based Pool is in shadow operation, i.e. it 
is carried out in parallel with the traditional power system operation model. Some concerns 
regarding the cost coverage of the generators exist (the revenues raised from energy, capacity 
and constraint payments may be not sufficient to cover the costs of some generating units). The 
legal separation of the generators is expected in the first quarter of 2001. The major 
preparatory accounting and engineering activities regarding the establishment of generation 
companies have already been done. The number of distribution companies is still in discussion 
and studies are carried out in order to identify the appropriate number of the companies. The 
regulatory framework is under development and the establishment of the regulator is 
anticipated at the beginning of second quarter of 2001.   
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